LETTER TO THE EDITOR From Elliot Wolfson:
In his review of Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in MedievalJewish Mysticism (henceforth Speculum) (in the Winter 1996 issue), Mark Vennan asserts that my interpretation of the visionary experience in Jewish mystical sources as phallocentric "is undeniably the most original and radical aspect of the book. Its audacity will probably attract the most attention and commentary, which is understandable but rather unfortunate. It is the weakest element of an otherwise solid and enriching presentation." Vennan fulfills his own prophecy by focusing principally in his review on this dimension of my work. While there were other questionable comments made by Vennan, I will concentrate only on his treatment of this issue.
In response to Vennan's criticism, it is incumbent upon me to mention at the outset a critical claim that I made in the second chapter of the Speculum that has gone unnoticed, but it is the aspect of the book that holds the key to understanding my analysis of gender and anthropomorphism in kabbalistic literature. What I have in mind is my discussion of the symbol and the imagination (pp. 61-67). Influenced in particular by Henry Corbin, Paul Ricouer, and Gilbert Durand, I have argued that the images produced by the imagination are symbolic representations through which the invisible becomes visible and the corporeal is spiritualized. The symbolic representation of the divine in the imagination is thus always embodied, i.e., the content of the symbol is experienced (and not merely described in a post-experiential account) in tenns of the body. What I tried to convey in the book is that the anthropomorphic representation of God in Jewish mystical sources, from the Hekhalot compositions to the Zohar, can be conceived of as an "imaginal body," and by this technical tenn I wish to convey the idea that the somatic fonn of God inheres in the human imagination as a symbolic configuration. This does not mean that the references to God's body are to be deciphered as merely allegorical or metaphorical. On the contrary, the language of the mystical texts points to an experience of divine embodiment, which is localized in the imagination. It should be obvious that since gender is an integral aspect of embodiment, the theoretical model that deals with embodiment will have something to contribute to the issue of the application of gender to God. The graphic and concrete language employed by the mystics does not mean that they attributed a body of flesh and blood to God. What it means is that the intensity of the religious experience was such that God is rendered as a tangible, anthropomorphic presence in the imagination.
This discussion is absolutely essential for understanding my analysis of gender symbolism, especially in my appropriation of the term "phallocentrism" to characterize the oculocentric tendency in the Jewish mystical sources. I will deal with some of the specific issues that Verman raised regarding my phallocentric interpretation, but in general it can be said that his comments do not indicate that he has considered my discussions on gender in light of the notion of the imaginal symbol that I develop. Thus, at one point Verman marvels at why I do not explain "what the mystics hoped to gain from witnessing a cosmic sex show featuring the disclosed Divine phallus." This trivialization of my argument with an obviously pejorative expression that calls to mind the world of pornography demonstrates that Verman did not relate my understanding of the kabbalistic use of phallic images to the discussion on the nature of the mystical symbol. I am here reminded of Erich Neumann's remark that those who refer to the ancient Egyptian myth of the genesis of the gods through masturbation as "obscene" are guilty of a "profound misunderstanding," for they personalize the transpersonal. The image of the divine phallus, wrote Neumann, "symbolizes the creative element, not personal genitality."1 This is an entirely apt description of the use of phallic symbolism in kabbalistic texts.
Having made this general observation, I am prepared to deal more specifically with Verman's criticisms. Unfortunately, however, due to editorial constraints, I cannot provide a rebuttal of all the misreadings found in Verman's review. I will present here a few salient examples and on the basis of these I will expose the problematic and ultimately unreliable nature ofVerman's arguments.
The first criticism relates to my reading of a passage in Leviticus Rabbab 20:10, which contrasts the behavior of Nadab and Abihu and that of . Verman objects to my understanding of the key expression "they loosened [the covering] of their heads" as a symbolic euphemism for the disclosure of the male organ. Verman protests that this explanation ignores the fact that this expression refers to the biblical injunction in Lev. 10:6 directed to the priests not to engage in public mourning activities. A careful examination of this verse, however, reveals that it is totally irrelevant for understanding the midrashic comment. The 'The Origins and History of Consciousness (Princeton, 1954), p. 19. author of the midrash attributes the activity of loosening the head covering to Nadab and Abihu, the two sons of Aaron whose death is described in Lev. 10:1-2. The injunction in Lev. 10:6 to which Yerman refers is addressed to the remaining priests, viz., Aaron, Eleazar, and Ithamar, who are instructed not to mourn in public. It may be concluded that this biblical reference in no way helps us understand why the midrashist attributed this very action to the two priests who died. It is evident that the act of loosening the head covering has an entirely different meaning here, and one that must be connected to the continuation of the midrashic passage, "their hearts became haughty, and their eyes feasted upon the Presence." I have decoded this reference on the basis of what is known about head covering in the Roman world of Late Antiquity (for references, see p. 43 n. 129). The uncovered head is associated with the masculine, whereas the covered head is associated with the feminine. Veiling the hair, therefore, signified modesty, loss of virginity, or subordination to a male authority figure. In the midrashic passage that I cited, the loosening of the head covering and the consequent exposure of the hair signify sexual immodesty, which is generally linked to women in the cultural context of Hellenistic Judaism. What is noteworthy is that in this midrashic text the gesture usually associated with a female is applied to the two rebellious sons of Aaron.
The next phallocentric interpretation that Yerman attempts to debunk is my reading of a critical passage from Hekhalot Rabbati (pp. 92-93). Yerman criticizes me for trying to substantiate my theory of the divine phallus on the basis of anatomical descriptions of the visionaries and not God. But there is an egregious obfuscation in Yerman's remarks. He claims that the text from Hekhalot Rabbati deals only with the eyes of the mystiC, but the passage unmistakably mentions the eyes of the garment of God, which no human eye can behold. I have suggested that the eyes must be decoded as phallic symbols and that the danger of beholding the garment is therefore related to a taboo of seeing the divine phallus. I also propose that the phallic symbolism of the eye underlies the description of the ocular gyrations and fiery discharges from the eye of one who gazes upon the garment. Yerman asserts that my phallic interpretation of the discharge from the eyes ignores the commonly held view (as we find in Plato's Timaeus) that the vision was predicated on the eye emitting visual fire. Yerman is correct to note that the passage from Hekhalot Rabbati in some way may be related to what has been called the theory of extramission, i.e., the belief that the eyes transmitted as well as received rays of light. However, such a reference does not undermine the phallocentric reading that I offered. Indeed, the belief in extramission may only strengthen the phallic understanding of the visual process. Vennan's reliance on an aspect of ancient optics does not obviate the problem of phallocentrism. From a femi)1ist perspective, any theory of the body is rooted in certain cultural assumptions about the nature of human embodiment, which is always related to the issue of gender. At the very least, the participatory dimension implied by the theory of extramission, whereby the viewer and viewed are intenwined, lends support to the understanding of the visual encounter as an erotic experience, which is a central part of my argument.
Vennan's evident discomfort with my orientation leads him into some other questionable readings. For example, in his summary of chapter six, Vennan asserts that I have tried "overly hard to associate imagination with the Divine phallus." Vennan focuses on my comment that " [t] here are kabbalistic sources that explicitly connect the phallic aspect of the divine and the production of images" (p. 316). He notes that I cite two sources from the Circle of Contemplation to support this assertion, but, in the opinion ofVennan, this evidence is not only meager but it does not prove the point. Vennan cites one of my two examples, Sod 'Eser Sefirot we-Sod ba-Gewanim, in which I claim that the ninth of the ten gradations, which corresponds to the phallic Yesod, is described as the "king in the power of the imagination." Vennan warns the reader that "it is Wolfson and not the kabbalist who interjects the phallic reference." What Vennan neglects to mention is the second passage from the same composition that I cite, for in that passage the ninth gradation is identified as the "secret of Torah," the "covenant of peace," and "king," which is the "power of the imagination." Anyone familiar with kabbalistic sources understands full well that the attribution of the tenn "covenant" (berit) to Yesod has a phallic connotation. It is evident that the expression berit sbalom, the "covenant of peace," is a phallic reference. The claim that I have interjected the phall~c reference is misleading and inaccurate.
Another example of what Vennan refers to as my "eisegesis" is the discussion ofSefer ba-Yi!JUd (p. 286). According to this text, the kabbalists, who are deemed worthy to see the king in his beauty, are said to enter the chamber of the king, to eat of its luscious fruit (based on Cant. 4: 16), and to take delight in the entertainment of the bridegroom and bride. The erotic element of this passage is suggested by the image of partaking of the fruit inside the king's chamber. In my opinion, this element is also underscored by the fact that the kabbalists are said to see the king in his beauty, which I decode as a reference to the phallus, and they take delight in the joy of the king of the bridegroom and bride (mazmu{e };Jatan wekba//ab). Vennan rejects my interpretation by reminding the reader (based on the authOrity ofJastrow) that the talmudic idiom, mazmu{e };Jatan we-kballab, refers to the "music played at the wedding feast." On the basis of this philological insight, Yerman contends that the passage from Seier ba-Yibud "does not depict a vision of Divine intimacy and union, .but a public event-the food and music of the wedding festivities." Yerman thus concludes that my "audacious contention" regarding the oculocentric and phallocentric orientation of theosophic kabbalists is not supported by this text.
First, let me note that there are several ways to explain the expression mazmu,e IJatan we-kballab, either as referring to music, as Yerman posits, or as referring to joy or delight (thus some explain the term as a synonym of sba'asbu'im). The original meaning of the expression, however, is completely irrelevant. The real issue is how the author of the kabbalistic text understands and applies the idiom. I never claimed that the meaning of the expression in its original setting is sexual activity. I simply stated that the author of Seier ba-Yi};JUd appropriated the talmudic expression and applied it to the sexual union of the divine bridegroom and bride. It is well known that medieval kabbalists employed rabbinic expressions for their own purposes and thereby invested them with new semantic signification. What justifies my interpretation is not lexicography, but an examination of the way the term is used in a specific literary context. The argument that this text does not depict the divine union but is about a public wedding feast is simply ludicrous. That has nothing whatsoever to do with the text. It is evident that the reference in this passage is to the divine bridegroom and bride. The kabbalists are worthy of beholding the king in his beauty, i.e., to partake of the divine as they witness the sacred union between the male and the female. The intimacy of this experience is depicted as well in terms of the metaphor of eating, a well-known trope in religious literature, especially prominent in mystical sources.
So resistant is Yerman to the idea that the phallus is at the center of the kabbalists' field of vision that he says that even in the seventh chapter of the book, which deals with the Zobar, I have not supported my hypothesis regarding the phallocentric nature of the visual encounter. Indeed, Yerman goes so far as to say that of the hundreds of texts that I present not one explicitly corroborates my claim that the mystical goal was to see the divine phallus. What the sources prove, according to Yerman, is that the visionary goal was to perceive the face of God. The issue of the divine face is crucial to Yerman because he thinks that I have privileged the phallus as the goal of vision and in the process neglected the face. Thus, Yerman surmises that I ignore entirely certain sections of the Zobar, Sifra di-~eniuta and Idra Rabba, because these contain graphic descriptions of the divine face and thus are not inherently phallocentric. Yerman even makes a point of letting the reader know that the visions of the divine face/ countenance cannot be traced in the index.
It is correct to say that I did not focus on these zoharic sections, but the reason that Yerman gives is wrong. At· the time of reworking the material contained in this chapter (based on earlier publications), I did not consider the intensely anthropomorphic descriptions of the Godhead that one finds in these parts of the Zohar to be necessarily visionary. In hindsight this may have been a wrong decision, and I would have done well to integrate these views into my analysis. I must say, however, that these sources would not support Yerman's claim at all. On the contrary, a careful examination of the anthropomorphic depictions of the divine faces in these sections would tip the balance in favor of my interpretation of the visionary experience as phallocentric. It is relevant to note here that on several occasions in the book I did remark that the face itself seems to function in mystical literature as a displacement for the phallus (such references can be found in the index, s.v., phallus). Even more directly related to Yerman's comment, in another study I have argued that the highest of the faces (par~ufim) of the divine described in the Idrot sections, 'Arikh 'Anpin and Ze'eir 'Anpin, are clearly phallic in nature. I have cited iconographic representations from manuscripts that correspond to the language of the zoharic texts.
2 What underlies the phallic depiction of these countenances, for example with respect to the characterization of the beard,3 is the assumption that the basic energy of the divine is phallic. Hence, even the contemplative processes attributed to the divine mind are portrayed symbolically in phallic terms. As I have argued in a number of studies, the upper phallic energy is related to an entity that is called in the Zohar the bo~ina' de-qardinuta', which I translate as the "hardened 2E. R. Wolfson, Circle in the Square: Studies in the Use of Germer in Kabbalistic Syrnbolism (Albany, 1995), pp. 196-197, n. 6. 'The euphemistic use of the beard for the phallus is attested in classical rabbinic sources. For references, see Wolfson, Circle in the Square, p. 197 n. 6. It is obvious that the kabbalists appropriated this euphemism and extended its usage to refer to the upper phallic aspects of God. This does not mean that I am suggesting that every occurrence of the word "beard" must be decoded as a phallic symbol. What I am saying is that when there are other semiotic indicators in a text regarding a phallic-like nature, then it is reasonable to assume this symbolic usage. Thus, in the [drot one finds the well-known descriptions of the oil overflowing from the thirteen curls of the beard of 'Arikh 'Anpin, which is called ma=al, playfully related by kabbalists to the root nzl. It is this additional element that in my mind justifies seeing a phallic reference here, buttressed by the philological fact that in rabbinic literature itself the beard can function euphemistically for. the male organ.
flame." This spark is also described as the line-of-measure (qav bamiddab) that extends and overflows, an obvious reference to the generative function of the phallus. I will not rehearse all of my arguments here, for the interested reader can examine on his or her own the evidence that I have marshalled in support of my view.
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From my perspective the centrality of the face is simply another facet of the phallocentrism that dominates the kabbalistic wocldview. The seeing of the face of the Sbekbinab, usually thought by scholars (including Verman) to be a representation of the feminine persona of God, is related in the sources that I discussed to the phallus, symbolized by such images as the corona of the male organ or the rainbow in the cloud. I do not deny the obvious point that the kabbalists use masculine and feminine images to speak about God. But the real issue of my book is the object of the visual experience. What do the kabbalists imagine when they see God? Does the zoharic author paint an elaborate portrait of a beautiful maiden as the goal of the visual experience? Or is there a transformation of the feminine into an aspect of the masculine in the moment of the visual encounter?s My contention is the latter. It is thus essential to bear in mind the key scriptural verses cited in the visionary contexts to which I refer: Gen. 18:1, Exod. 34:23, Ezek. 1:4, Job 19:26, and Cant. 3:11 (to name the more important ones), verses that were all interpreted as a reference to the disclosure of the divine phallus. By means of the vision the kabbalist is reintegrated into the Godhead and the feminine aspect is itself restored to the masculine so that the unity of the divine is restored. 'According to Zohar 1:72b (and parallel in 1:117a), at the beginning of the messianic redemption the Shekhinah, symbolized as the rainbow, will appear in the colors ofthe bride adorned before her spouse. One might contend that this is an example of a visual encounter of a feminine form. To a degree this is correct, but a careful analysis of the passage indicates that the imaging of the Shekhinah as female is appropriate for the transition from exile to redemption. The consummation of this process is marked by the restoration of the feminine to the masculine, a transformation signified by the sign of the covenant. In this state, the bride (the feminine as the object ofdesire) becomes the crown (the feminine integrated into the masculine self). I have discussed these passages in "Re/membering the Covenant: Memory, Forgetfulness, and the Construction of History in the Zohar," to appear in the festschrift in honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi. This gender transfonnation is implied in the extended passage in the Zobar (1:50b-51b) that presents the technique of gazing at a candle in order "to know the wisdom of the holy unity." Vennan mentions the fact that I neglected to discuss this text, and he implies that the reason I do so is that it "engenders a non-phallic visualization of the Godhead," which does not fit into my general theory regarding the phallomorphic nature of the visionary experience. Vennan is correct to note my oversight in failing to discuss this passage, but his explanation is incorrect and once again reveals his inattentiveness to the embodied nature of kabbalistic symbolism. A careful and more nuanced reading of this source indicates that the issues of gender are percolating beneath the surface. The zoharic author recommends that one should gaze at a flame that rises from the coal or upon a candle that is burning. It is the second image that engages the imagination of the zoharic author, but the importance of the first image, which can be traced to Sefer Ye~irab, is that it underscores the point that a flame only rises when it is united with gross matter. In accord with a typical medieval hierarchy, the flame is the spiritual element that is sustained by the material. It is also evident that this can be transmuted into gender tenns: the flame is the masculine and the coal the feminine. Even if this correlation is not stated explicitly here, it is consistent with the symbolism adopted by the Zobar and with the larger intellectual world of the Middle Ages.
But the example of the candle offers a somewhat more complex symbolism. There are three flames: the "concealed flame," the "white flame," and the "blue-black flame." It is well known that the zoharic author frequently refers to the sefirotic potencies in tenns derived from the world of sense experience. This particular text is an example of that phenomenon, and it is thus obvious that the implicit meaning here is the unification of the sefirot, which constitutes the unity of the Godhead. Most of the discussion concerns the white flame and the blue-black flame; the concealed flame refers to one of the higher sefirot, most likely Binab. The radiant white flame rises above in a direct line, and the blue-black flame serves as the throne of glory for the white flame. The white flame is thus described as resting upon the blue-black flame and uniting with it so that everything is one. The symbolic intent of this imagery is given by the Zobar itself through the voice of Simeon ben Yo~ai: the blue-black flame is the final be' of the Tetragrammaton, i.e., the feminine Sbekbinab, which is united with the white flame or the yod-be'-waw of the name, i.e., the masculine Tiferet. The unification of the two flames, therefore, represents the perfection of the name. But the blue-black flame is only the final be' of the Tetragrammaton when the community of Israel (i.e., the male Israelites) are conjoined to the Shekhinah from below so that she is united with the masculine potency. When Israel is not conjoined to the Shekhinah, she is in the form of a datet, which clearly symbolizes her state of impoverishment or weakness (related to the word dal). Significantly, the verse that the zoharic author quotes to make this point is "If there be a damsel that is a virgin," ki yihyeh na'arah betutah (Deut. 22:23) . According to the masoretic orthography, the world na'arah is written na'ar, i.e., without the final he'. In response to why this is so, the zoharic author writes: "Because she is not united with the masculine, and wherever male and female do not exist, the he' does not exist. It departs from there and she is left datet. When she is united with the radiant white flame, she is called he', for then everything is united as one." The Shekhinah, therefore, is a mercurial entity: when united with Israel from below she is united with the male above, and this unification transforms her semiotic status from datet to he'. Underlying this linguistic symbolism is an ontological presumption: the Shekhinah is transformed from the impoverished feminine (the virgin .written as na'ar) to the enriched feminine, the virgin that has united with the male (symbolically represented as the na'arah). In this particular example the phallic language is not used explicitly, but it is not unreasonable to assume that it is operative here as well. The ontic transformation of the Shekhinah is related to the larger issue of phallomorphism that I have discussed.
Verman's discomfort with my orientation is obvious from his readiness to dismiss an overabundance of textual evidence that I have presented to the reader. Consider, for example, his reading of a text from Isaac of Acre that I cite (p. 359) . In order to demonstrate that the word qeshet, bow, refers to 'Atarah, Isaac recommends that one contemplate the arc of the penis, which is in the shape of the letter waw, and the corona, which is in the form of a yod. Verman claims that this text does not suggest that God possesses a penis, but only that if one wants to understand the relationship between Yesod and Matkhut, one should consider the human anatomy. Such a reading, however, misses the point. According to the kabbalistic symbolism, the transcendent divine reality is concretized in the body. I do not suggest that Isaac of Acre, or any other kabbalist for that matter, attributed a coarse body to God. The sefirotic entities compose the imaginal body of God by means of which the material is spiritualized and the spiritual is materialized. To know the unity of Yesod and Matkhut, it is essential to contemplate the male organ, for by so doing one comes to realize that Yesod is the waw and Matkhut the yod, which is the corona of the phallus.
This leads me to the final point. Yerman argues that the term 'a{arab in this passage has the primary connotation of regal crown, and that it is thus related to the issue of Malkbut, or sovereignty. He insists that when this term appears as a name of the last emanation one should not disregard its primary connotation unless the context indicates otherwise. He claims, however,. that I blithely assume that references to 'a{arab can be interpreted as referring to the penile corona. And, if that sin were not great enough, I am guilty of extending this hypothesis to other terms for the crown, such as #~and kelil. This is "highly suspect," according to Yerman, because these terms are never used in conjunction with the penis and thus my interpretation "is entirely dependent upon psychoanalytic presuppositions. " Once again, what is necessary to see through this smokescreen is to examine my textual examples carefully. When one does that, it will become obvious that I do exactly what Yerman suggests, i.e., I interpret the term 'a{arab as the penile corona only when the context warrants it. Thus, when I wrote that the "symbolic correlation of the corona of the penis and the feminine Sbekbinab is facilitated by the philological coincidence that the word 'a{arab, 'crown,' is the technical name of that part of the male anatomy as well as one of the designations of the Sbekbinab" ( 358), I did not imply that every occurrence of the term 'a{arab has this connotation. What I intended was that this philological coincidence allows for the localization of the feminine in the male organ, a theme that I have developed in a number of writings. This is precisely the point of the passage of Isaac ofAcre mentioned above: the word qesbet refers to 'Afarab, for Malkbut is the corona of the penis, symbolic of Yesod. I cannot reproduce here all the references to the texts wherein this symbol is employed. I am confident that a careful scrutiny of all of these sources would verify my claim that in each case the context justifies the interpretation of the term 'a{arab as a reference to the corona and that the ultimate point of this symbolism is to underscore the idea that the feminine is part of the male.
The acceptance of the new paradigm regarding the use of gender symbolism in kabbalistic sources that I have put forth in the Speculum and in other writings will not come easily. I have no delusions about this, and I am aware of the fact that I will be called upon constantly to defend my readings. But, as I believe this rejoinder shows, in order to dismiss or even challenge my interpretations there will have to be a more careful and sophisticated textual analysis. And, in the end, the issue is not merely the presentation of texts because texts are not objective artifacts that can be submitted as exhibits before a judge. Texts demand readers, and interpretation arises in the interaction between the two. Beyond philolOgical competence the interpretative stance must be enhanced by knowledge of what others have said regarding the creative endeavors of human history. Hermeneutical approaches take shape within a specific cultural matrix that is informed by our collective efforts at understanding the past. It is time for other scholars in Jewish mysticism to play the game.
Mark Yerman replies:
Elliot Wolfson's Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism (henceforth Speculum) is a fascinating and informative monograph. In my lengthy review I discussed both its strengths and its weaknesses. What I found most problematic was his phallocentric thesis. It is exclusively this subject to which Wolfson devotes his even lengthier rejoinder. In so doing he offers further demonstration of his innovative approach to the textual interpretation of Jewish mystical literature.
Clearly, the viability of Wolfson's contentions rest upon the validity of his explications of specific texts. I shall shortly respond to some of his contentions. Even were one to fully endorse his elucidations, would this substantiate his panoramic claim in the Conclusion? Therein he maintains that ancient and medieval Jewish visionaries were engaged in a shared enterprise: "common to the visionary accounts in the different mystical sources I examined in this work-the writings of the Hekhalot mystics, German Pietists, and theosophic kabbalists-is the notion that the object of the mystical vision is the male deity and, more specifically, the phallus (p. 395). A more graphic contention follows: "It is obvious from these settings as well that the ejaculated phallus is the object of vision" (p. 396). In the first six chapters of Speculum, which trace Jewish visionary experience from biblical times through pre-Zoharic kabbalah, he offers approximately half a dozen phallocentric interpretations of phrases, derived from as many texts. Nowhere does he even try to establish that these few, isolated expressions are indeed programmatic statements, which represent the focus of any of the books/mystics from which they are drawn. Accordingly, his contention that a vision of the ejaculated Divine phallus was the goal of pre-Zoharic Jewish mysticism is totally unsubstantiated and can be dismissed out of hand.
Turning now to specifics, let us first consider Wolfson's defense of his phallic interpretation of a midrashic explanation for the premature death of Aaron's sons, Nadab and Abihu, described in Lev. 10:1-2. Wolfson rendered the source: "R. Tanhuma said: This teaches that they loosened [the covering of] their heads, their hearts became haughty, and their eyes feasted upon the Presence" (p. 42). His original discussion of this passage included the following comment: "the uncovering of the head symbolizes the disclosure of the male organ, perhaps in an ejaculatory state" (p. 43). In his rejoinder he claims that my reference to Lev. 10:6, wherein Aaron and his surviving sons are enjoined not to loosen their head coverings, is "totally irrelevant for understanding the midrashic comment." Really? Is R. Tanhuma more interested in employing a "symbolic euphemism" (which, as Wolfson explains, is only intelligible if one inverts the Hellenistic dress code for men and women), than he is in using a peculiar expression pertaining to pri~stly comportment that occurs later on in that very same biblical narrative?
I am accused of "egregious obfuscation" in my critique of "a critical passage" from Hekhalot Rabbati. This is most puzzling. Wolfson originally cited a text that describes the mystic's act of vision: "his eyeballs are seized by pulsations, and his eyeballs emit and send forth flames of fire" (p. 92). His subsequent comments included the follOWing statement: "The phallic symbolism of the eye also underlies the description of the ocular gyrations and fiery discharges from the eye of one who does gaze upon the cloak of glory" (p. 93). I merely pointed out the obvious-the "phallic" fiery discharges that are described in Hakhalot Rabbati and to which Wolfson refers in these comments emanated from the mystic's eyes and not God's. Admittedly, in a subsequent passage there is a description of lights issuing from God's eyes. This further underscores that what is operant in this text is a general theory of optics, as I noted in my review.
In reference to Wolfson's handling of Sod 'Eser Sefirot, I indicated that the text simply used the standard kabbalistic term Yesod, Foundation.
Wolfson, however, was projecting his agenda upon the text by characterizing it as "Yesod or the divine phallus" (p. 316); the term "divine phallus" does not appear in the original. Wolfson also criticizes me for neglecting to acknowledge another passage from that same text that he cited in which the ninth gradation is referred to as the "covenant of peace." He comments: "It is evident that the expression bertt shalom, the "covenant of peace," is a phallic reference. The claim that I have interjected the phallic reference is misleading and inaccurate." Let me point out that bertt shalom is a biblical expression. In passages where it appears, such as Num. 25:12, Ezek. 34:25 and 37:26, it is clearly not referring to circumcision, but rather to a pact, which is the primary sense of bertt. Accordingly, the mere occurrence of the terms yesod and berit shalom in a text are insufficient for arguing that the author is concerned with imaging the divine phallus.
Wolfson's response to my comments on SeIer ha-Yihud indicates that he misinterpreted my point. I fully concur that the passage is describing the intradivine marriage celebration at which the mystics are guests-at issue is the extent of their panicipation. The passage reads: "they delight in the entenainment (mazmute) of the bridegroom and bride" (p. 286). Wolfson contends that the "entenainment" referred to in this text represents the sexual play of the newly married couple and that the mystics are hereby granted a vision of "the divine phallus disclosed in the moment of coitus" (p. 286). As I indicated, the common expression "entenainment of the bridegroom and bride" in its original rabbinic formulation does not refer to the activities of the wedding couple, but rather to wedding festivities, specifically music. This is evidently how this expression is used in this text, as well. (Wolfson's assenion that " [ t] he original meaning of the expression, however, is completely irrelevant" is aStounding!) The mystics delight in the joyous occasion of the Divine wedding feast. Paralleling human weddings, this is an inherently public event that precedes the private act of divine union. There is, however, no indication in the text to suppon Wolfson's contention that the visionaries actually witness divine intercourse.
Wolfson's comments on Zohar 1:50b-51b-a visionary technique, which he neglected to discuss in Speculum-are unconvincing. Although he dismisses my contention that this material does not exhibit phallomorphism, he concludes a rather lengthy discourse by acknowledging, "[i]n this panicular example the phallic language is not used explicitly, but it is not unreasonable to assume that it is operative here as well." Moreover, the focus of his inconclusive discussion penains to a zoharic discussion of Deut. 22:23. This material constitutes a discrete unit that is not pan of the initial explanation of visualizing Divine Unity by means of candle-gazing, based instead on verses from Deuteronomy 4. Wolfson's text is introduced by the phrase, "And R. Shimon returned with his colleagues. R. Shimon said, "This [topic] that we have discussed ..." (Zohar 1:51a). Clearly this second discourse constitutes an extension of the topicalthough relevant, it is nonetheless of secondary imponance, however it be interpreted.
Wolfson concludes by inviting "other scholars in Jewish mysticism to play the game." If he· wants others to take his phallocentric thesis seriously, he would do well to respond in a comprehensive manner to two issues, which he has studiously avoided up to this point. He refuses to acknowledge, let alone justify, the psychoanalytic nature of his enterprise. A hermeneutic evidenced in the preceding example, which is dedicated to uncovering gender issues that "are percolating beneath the surface," and positing subterranean phallic associations, without any corroboration, pays homage to classical psychoanalysis. In Speculum and here in this rejoinder, however, Wolfson characterizes his approach as feminist. Championing the cause of phallocentrism is not an inherently feminist undertaking! It is quite ironic that one of the feminists who influenced Wolfson was Luce Irigaray. A prominent French psychoanalyst, she lost her position in the Department of Psychoanalysis at Vincennes, following the publication in 1974 of her classic study, Speculum of the Other Woman. Therein she pointedly criticized the psychoanalytic establishment for its preoccupation with phallocentrism.
Additionally, he should fully articulate the purpose of a vision of the disclosed Divine phallus. Why would Jewish mystics engage in this activity? Although one could easily make a case that the goal of Jewish mysticism was to achieve Divine enlightenment and that visualizing the Divine Face would promote this end, it is not at all clear what is served by imaging the Divine phallus.
Speculum is a provocative contribution to the study of Jewish mysticism. Elliot Wolfson is to be congratulated on his award-winning monograph, and we look forward to his future accomplishments in the field.
